CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 125

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discussions. The precise figure of the reduced commitment which we should

seek should relate to the effect of this reduction on our actual present

force levels on the mainland, which were in fact somewhat below the

formal commitment under the Treaty. In considering our future freedom

of action it was important to bear in mind that, in the course of the next twelve months,a number of difficulties relating to the abolition of the commitment which at present imposed political restraints on us

would be resolved.

In discussion there was general recognition of the difficulty of

obtaining at this juncture a total release from our numerical commitment under the Revised Brussels Treaty. A number of suggestions were considered

which might nevertheless give us a somewhat greater freedom of action than the proposal put forward by the Foreign Secretary. These included the

following -

(1) We might seek to negotiate a commitment to a considerable

lower level of forces than the figure now proposed, thereby obtaining greater freedom of action to withdraw forces the following year. This might be coupled with an undertaking

to make our best endeavours to contribute further forces in

accordance with the force levels determined annually by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

(ii) We might seek agreement that we should commit to NATO say

five brigade groups of which only a proportion should at any

time be stationed on the mainland of Europe.

(iii) We might express our commitments in terms of military formations

rather than in terms of number of troops.

(iv) We might seek agreement that the number of forces within our

total commitment which were deployed at any time on the mainland of Europe should be determined annually by agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and ourselves.

prefented

It was however recognised that all these proposals prefented certain

difficulties on military or political grounds. In particular, any proposal

which implied that next year we would withdraw a given level of forces

would be damaging to our position in the Tripartite discussions and to

the agreement which was about to be concluded on offset payments for the

current year.

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